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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
TRISTAM B. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Civil No. 8522

ROSWELL MILLER, III,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tristam B. Johnson, plaintiff and respondent,
commenced this action against Roswell Miller, defendant and appellant, on the 8th day of November,
1955, (R.6) to recover damages for alienation of
affections and criminal conversation of plaintiff's
former wife, I-Ielen Harris Johnson ( R. 1-4) .
Plaintiff took defendant's deposition on the 13th
day of January, 1956, (R. 47-48). Defendant refused to answer certain questions propounded to defendant at the taking of said deposition, which deposition is a part of the record herein (R. 60-61).
Thereafter on the 22nd day of March, 1956, the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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trial court entered an order requiring defendant
to answer said questions and assessing attorney's
fees against defendant in the amount of $100.00 on
the ground that defendant's refusal to answer the
questions was without substantial justification
( R. 47-48) . From this order defendant appeals.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
(a) THE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR ALIENATION
OF AFFECTIONS AND CRIMINAL CONVERSATION
ARE ABOUSHED BY STATUTE IN THE JURISDICTIONS CONCERNING WHICH SAID QUESTIONS
WERE ASKED.

(b) SINCE THE ACTS OF APPELLANT IN SAID
JURISDICTIONS HAD NO OPERATIVE EFFECT, APPELLANT WAS PRIVILEGED NOT TO ANSWER THE
QUESTIONS BY REASON OF THE PROVISIONS OF
SECTION 78-24-9, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
POINT II
SAID ORDER VIOLATED APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THAT THE ANSWERS TO
SAID QUESTIONS WOULD TEND TO INCRIMINATE
APPELLANT.
POINT III
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ASSESSING
ATTORNEYS' FEES AGAINST APPELLANT.

STATEMENT OF THE RECORD
As heretofore noted respondent commenced this
action on the 8th day of November, 1955 (R. 5). On
the 13th day of January, 1956, prior to the time
2
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that appellant had ansvvered respondent's complaint
(R. 14) and prior to the time that appellant was required to answer respondent's complaint (R. 11),
respondent took appellant's deposition on oral interrogatories ( R. 47-48) .
At the taking of said deposition respondent
propounded certain questions t_Q_Jlppellant concerning appellant's relationships with ~espondent's former wife in the states of New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Nevada, Wyoming, Idaho and Canada.
See appellant's deposition and record 25-42. Both
the preliminary and ultimate questions propounded
by respondent at the taking of said deposition were
directed at the relationships between appellant and
respondent's former wife and were particularly directed at establishing the fact that appellant had had
sexual intercourse with respondent's former wife.
Appellant refused to answer such questions. Thereafter appellant filed his answer on January 24, 1956
(R. 14-15).
Appellant also filed amendments to his answer
in which he pleaded as affirmative defenses the laws
of New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Nevada
and Wyoming abolishing the causes of action for
alienation of affections and criminal conversation
(R. 16-17, 21-22, 19-20).
On the 22nd day of March, 1956, pursuant to
3
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respondent's motion, the court entered an order requiring appellant to answer the questions propounded to him at the taking of his deposition and assessing attorney's fees against appellant on the ground
that appellant's refusal to answer the questions was
without substantial justification (R. 47-48).
Pursuant to stipulation of the parties the statutes of New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Nevada and Wyoming abolishing the causes of action for
alienation of affections and criminal conversation
were in evidence and before the court at the hearing
of said motion (R. 43-44, 21-22).
Pursuant to stipulation of the parties the statutes of the aforesaid jurisdictions subjecting appellant to danger of prosecution for adultery and the
statutes of the United States subjecting appellant
to danger of criminal prosecution for transporting
a female in interstate and foreign commerce for immoral purposes were in evidence and before the court
on the hearing of said motion (R. 44-45).
POINT I
(a) THE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR ALIENATION
OF AFFECTIONS AND CRIMINAL CONVERSATION
ARE ABOLISHED BY. STATUTE IN THE JURISDICTIONS CONCERNING WHICH SAID QUESTIONS
WERE ASKED.

At all ti1nes n1aterial to this action, appellant,
respondent and respondent's former wife resided
4
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and were domiciled in the State of New Jersey
(R. 5, appellant's deposition pp. 4-8, 25-26). As
above set forth respondent propounded specific questions as to appellant's acts and relationships with
respondent's former wife in New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, Nevada and Wyoming. The causes of
action for alienation of affections and criminal conversation are abolished by statute in said jurisdictions. The preambles to the statutes, declaring the
public policy of those states with reference to the
causes of action, and the provisions of the statutes
are in substance the same. See: Chapter 279, Laws
of New Jersey, 1935, Sections 23-1 through 23-6 of
Title 2-A of the Revised Statutes of the State of
New Jersey; Sections 61-a through 61-i of Article
2-A of the Civil Practice Act of the State of New
York; Chapter 36, Session Laws of Wyoming, 1941,
Chapter 3, Sections 512 through 516 of the Wyoming Compiled Statutes, 1945; No. 189, Laws of Pennsylvania, 1935, Title 48, Sections 170 through 177,
Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes, 1936; and, Chapter 53, Laws of Nevada, 1943, Sections 4071 through
4071.07, Nevada Compiled Laws of 1929, 1949 Supplement. The New Jersey statute, Chapter 279,
Laws of New Jersey, 1935, reads as follows:
"AN ACT declaring and carrying into effect
th.e public policy of the State of New Jersey
w1th respect to causes of action for alienation
of the affections, criminal conversation, seducr·
u
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tion, and breach of contract to marry, actions
thereon, contracts with respect thereto and
acts and proceedings in connection therewith.
WHEREAS, The remedies herein provided
for by law for the enforc~ment of actions
based upon alleged alienation of affections,
criminal conversation, seduction and breach
of contract to marry have been subjected to
grave abuses, causing extreme annoyance,
embarrassment, humiliation and pecuniary
damage to many persons wholly innocent and
free of any wrongdoing, who were merely--the
victims of circumstances, and such remedies
having been exercised by- UJ1scrupulous persons for their unjust enrichment and such
remedies having furnished vehicles for the
commission or attempted commission of crime
and in many cases have resulted in the perpetration of frauds, it is hereby declared as
the public policy of the State of New Jersey
that the best interests of the people of the
State will be served by the abolition of such
remedies. Consequently, in the public interest,
the necessity for the enactment of this. arti~le
is hereby declared as a n1atter of legislative
detern1ination; therefore,
BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and General

Assembly of the State of New Jersey:
1. The rights of action heretofore existing to recover sums of money as damage for
the alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction, or breach of contract to
n1arry are hereby abolished.

*

*

*

*

No act hereafter done _U)ithin-·-fhis·
State sh-all operate to give rise, either w_ithin.
4.

6
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or without this State, to any of the rights .of
aetioii" cibolfihed by this article. * * * (ItaliCS
added.)

5. It shall hereinafter be unlawful for
any person either as a party or attorney, or
an agent o~ other person in ~ehalf of either,
to file or serve, cause to be filed or served or
threaten to file or serve, or to threaten to
cause to be filed or served, any process or
pleading, in any court of the State setting
forth or seeking to recover a sum of money
upon any cause of action abolished or barred
by this article, whether such cause of action
arose within or without the state.
6. All contracts and instruments of
every kind, name, nature or description, which
may hereafter be executed within this State
in payment, satisfaction, settlement or compromise of any claim or cause of action
abolished or barred by this article, whether
such claim or cause of action arose within or
without this State, are hereby declared to be
contrary to the public policy of this State
and absolutely void. It shall be unlawful to
cause, induce or procure any person to execute
such a contract or instrument; or cause, induce or procure any person to give, pay, transfer or deliver any money or thing of value in
p~yment, satisfaction,. settlement or compromise of any such claim or cause of action·
or to .receive, take or accept any such money
or thing of value as such payment, satisfaction, settlement or compromise. It shall be
unlawful to commence or cause to be commenced, either ~s party or att~rney, or as
agent or otherwise In behalf of either, in any
7
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court of this State, any proceeding or action
seeking to enforce or recover upon any such
contract or instrument, knowing it to be such,
whether the same shall have been executed
within or without this state * * *.
7. Any person who shall violate any of
the provisions of this article shall be guilty of
a felony which shall be punishable by a fine of
not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00)
nor more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), or by imprisonment for a term of not
less than one year nor more than five years,
or by both such fine and imprisonment, in
the discretion of the court. (The penalty has
since been reduced to a misdemeanor in New
Jersey. It remains a felony in other jurisdictions.)
8. This article shall be liberally construed to effectuate the objects and purposes
thereof and the public policy of the State as
herelby declared. * * *"
The aforesaid statutes as a matter of declared
public policy abolish said actions and provide that
no act or acts done within those jurisdictions shall
operate to give rise, either within or without said
jurisdictions, to any of the rights of action set forth
in respondent's complaint.
Counsel for appellant has made a detailed
search of the authorities under both the federal and
state rules of civil procedure and the codes of civil
procedure. This search has failed to disclose any decisions on the precise question presented herein,
8
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to-wit, whether or not a pl_aintif! i~_ -~n action for
alienation of affections and criminal conversation
brought in a state recognizing such actions may go
into acts claimed to have occurred in a state or states
in which such actions have as a matter of declared
public policy been abolished by statutes that specifically provide that no act or acts done in such states
shall have operative effect either within or without
such states.
In a very similar situation that was in principle the same as the matter presented here the New
York court refused to permit discovery by the plaintiffo See In Re Glasser (1950) 100 N.Y.S. 2d 723.
In the Glasser case the plaintiff instituted an action
for alienation of affections in the State of Connecticut where such actions are recognized. In the course
of the proceedings the plaintiff sought to force discovery of evidence of certain actions of the defendant within the State of New York. The New York
court refused to permit the discovery on the ground
that the New York statute had abolished the cause
of action for alienation of affections. In so holding
the New York court quoted verbatim the statute
abolishing causes of action for alienation of affections and criminal conversation and, in particular,
that part of the statute that expressly provides that
no act or acts done within the State of New York
shall operate to give rise, either within or without
9
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the state, to any of the rights thereby abolished.
The questions asked by respondent were directed specifically to the social relationships and the
fact of sexual intercourse between appellant and
·respondent's former wife in New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Nevada and Wyoming, where the
causes of action for alienation of affections and criminal conversation are abolished by statute.
The questions ·sought to elicit answers as to
specific instances and as to specific acts in the jurisdictions above named. An examination of appellant's
deposition, pages 1 to 37, shows the questions followed the same general pattern, to-wit:
( 1) Were you alone with Helen in the
State of New Jersey or New York?
( 2) Did you register as man and wife
in a hotel in New York?
(3) Did you have sexual relations with
Helen in the State of New Jersey or New
York?
The acts and conduct of appellant and respondent's former wife cannot, under the express wording of said statutes, operate to give rise to any rights
in favor of respondent either within or without said
states. To require appellant to answer these questions would be directly in the teeth of the declared
public policy of said statutes, which is to prevent
abuse and humiliation and directly in the teeth of
10
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Rules 30(b), 30(d) and 37(a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which rules expressly provide for protection of parties and witnesses from examination that,
as in the case before this court, subjects the deponent to annoyance, embarrassment and oppression~
That the law of the place where the acts of appellant are claimed to have occurred determines
whether or not such acts have operative effect or
give rise to any rights in favor of respondent, see:
15 C.J.S. Conflict of Laws, Sec. 12, p. 897; Buhler
v. Maddison (1947) 109 U. 267, 176 P. 2d 118;
Pringle v. Gibson ( 1937) 135 Me. 297, 195 A. 695.
Professor Wigmore, in discussing the question
of whether or not the law of the place where the acts
occur or the law of the forum determines the question of admissability of evidence, reviews the authorities and concludes that the law of the forum determines the admissability of evidence, Vol. 1, Wigmore, On Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 5. He goes on to
state, ibid, p. 162 :
"But there are certain apparent exceptions to it (the rule that the admissability of
evidence is determined by reference to the law
of the forum) which are in truth instances of
separate principles and need to be distinguished:
" ( 1) Some rule of substantive law as to
the validity of an act, in form or in essentials,
may be adopted from the foreign law, because
11
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of the party's domicile or of the place of the
transaction; and thus a question may arise
whether a particular requirement is a rule of
evidence or a rule of substantive law."
He then reviews the authorities, ibid, pp. 162164, to the effect that where the law of the place
where the acts occur makes such acts invalid in the
sense of not having operative effect, evidence as to
the acts is inadmissable under the law of the forum-

~n th~ugh~by~the

-

law o:(the~forum -such acts- would

have·- had- opei~ative effect.--The -following are . examples. -whether or -not oral evidence is admissable
to vary the terms of a written contract is determined
by reference to the law of the place where the contract is made and not by reference to the law of the
forum, Dunn v. Welsh ( 1879) 62 Ga. 241, and Baxter Nat. Bank v. Talbot (1891) 154 Mass. 213, 38
N.E. 163, 13 L.R.A. 52, because the law of the place
where the acts occur determines their operative effect. The procedure to be followed in hearings on
commitments in extradition proceedings is determined by reference to the law of the forum, but such
procedural rules do not give rise to a right in the
defendants to introduce evidence made irrelevant by
treaty between the United States and a foreign
country, Collins v. Loysel (1922) 259 U.S. 309,
66 L. Ed. 956, 42 Sup. Ct. 469.
..

·

. . . . . .·

..

~

, ..

(b) SINCE THE ACTS OF APPELLANT IN SAID

12
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JURISDICTIONS HAD NO OPERATIVE EFFECT, APPELLANT WAS PRIVILEGED NOT TO ANSWER THE
QUESTIONS BY REASON OF THE PROVISIONS OF
SECTION 78-24-9, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.

Section 78-24-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
reads as follows :
"A witness must answer questions legal
and pertinent to the matter in issue although
his answer may establish a claim against
himself; but he need not give an answer which
will have a tendency to subject him to punishment for a felony; nor need he give an answer
which will have a direct tendency to degrade
his character unless it is to the very fact in
iss~te or to a fact from which the fact in issue
would be presumed. But a witness must
answer as to the fact of his previous conviction of felony." (Italics added.)
As above set forth, supra page 5, the causes
of action for alienation of affections and criminal
conversation are abolished in the jurisdictions concerning which appellant was interrogated. By the
express wording of the statutes abolishing the causes
of action the acts of appellant in those jurisdictions
do not have operative effect. The questions asked of
appellant were not, therefore, directed to the fact
in issue or a fact from which the fact in issue could
be inferred. The questions asked of appellant had a
direct tendency to degrade his character. Appellant
was, therefore, privileged not to answer the questions under the express wording of the statute
quoted above.
13
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Appellant is now married to respondent's former wife. Respondent and respondent's former wife
have four minor children. Appellant has two minor
children. Since the acts of appellant inquired about
are not operative and do not give rise to any rights
whatever in favor of respondent, we submit that
requiring appellant to answer those questions would
serve only to subject appellant, respondent's former
wife and the six minor children of the parties to
extreme embarrassment, annoyance and humiliation.
POINT II
SAID ORDER VIOLATED APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THAT THE ANSWERS TO
SAID QUESTIONS WOULD TEND TO INCRIMINATE
APPELLANT.

The questions propounded to appellant at the
taking of the deposition consisted of preliminary
questions as to appellant's whereabouts on particular occasions, immediately followed by questions as
to whether or not appellant saw respondent's former
wife on those occasions and invariably culminating
in questions as to whether or not appellant and respondent's former wife had sexual intercourse on
those occasions, all of which formed a link in the line
of questions tending to show that appellant had committed adultery with respondent's former wife. The
questions were also directed at whether or not appellant had transported respondent's former wife
14
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across state lines and into Canada for immoral purposes.
That the facts sought to be elicited constituted
adultery under the laws of New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Nevada, Wyoming and Idaho and the
crime of transporting a female person in interstate
and foreign commerce for immoral purposes in violation of the Federal Mann Act, see record pp. 44-45.
That a person is not required to testify to facts
that may tend to incriminate him under the laws .
of another jurisdiction, see: United States v. Saline /
Bank ( 1828) 1 Pet. 100, 7 L. Ed. 69; Ballman v.
Fagin ( 1905) 200 U.S. 186, 26 Sup. Ct. 212, 50 L.
Ed. 433; United States v. Lombardo (1915, D.C.
Wash.) 228 Fed. 980; InReDoyle (1930, D.C.N.Y.)
42 Fed. 2d 686; Morse v. Nussbaum ( 1900) 55 App.
Div. 245, 67 N.Y.S. 492; In Re Kanter ( 1902, D.C.
N.Y.) 117 Fed. 356; and, In Re Feldstein (1900,
D.C.N.Y.) 103 Fed. 269.
In United States v. Saline Bank the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the federal court
for the district of Virginia in holding that the privilege against self-incrimination applied to matters
that would tend to incriminate the defendants under
state law. The court, speaking through Chief Justice Marshall, said at 1 Pet. p. 104:
"This is a bill in equity for a discovery
and relief. The defendants set up a plea in
15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

bar, alleging that the discovery would subject
them to penalties under the statute of Virginia. The court below decided in favor of the
validity of the plea and dismissed the bill.
It is apparent that in every step of the suit
the facts required to be discovered in support
of the suit would expose the parties to danger.
The rule clearly is, that a party is not bound
to make any discovery which would expose
him to penalty, and this case falls within it.
The decree of the court below is therefore
affirmed.''
In Ballman v. Fagin it was held that a witness
called before a federal grand jury could refuse, under the claim of privilege against incrimination, to
produce a cash book and could refuse to disclose
whether or not he had control thereof because to do
so might tend to show him guilty of a criminal stock
transaction in violation of state law. The supreme
court, speaking through Justice Holmes, said at
200 u.s. p. 195:
"The subject under investigation, according to the government's statement, was the
criminal liability of some employee of a national bank from the vaults of which a large
amount of casl1 had disappeared. The book
very possibly may have disclosed dealings with
the person or persons naturally suspected,
and, especially in view of the charges that
Ballman kept a 'bucket shop', dealings of a
nature likely to lead to a charge that Ballman
was an abettor of the guilty man. If he was,
he was guilty of a misdemeanor under revised
16
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statute Section 5209, and no more bound to
produce the book than to give testimony to the
facts which is disclosed.
"Not impossibly Ballman took this aspect
of the matter for granted, as one which would
be perceived by the court without his disagreeably emphasizing his own fears. But he
did call attention to another less likely to be
known. As we have said, he set forth that
there were many proceedings on foot against
him as a party to a 'bucket shop' and so subject to the criminal law of the state in which
the grand jury was sitting. According to
United States v. Saline Bank, he was exonerated from disclosures which would have exposed him to the penalties of the state law."
In United States v. Lombardo the court held
that defendant was privileged not to make certain
sworn statements under federal law pertaining to
prostitution because the statements might tend to
show him guilty of operating a house of prostitution
under the laws of the State of Washington. In so
holding the court said at 228 Fed. p. 981:
"The contention of the government that
Brown v. Walker is controlling is not accepted. In the Brown case the immunity
granted by the act was held as broad as the
fifth amendment by a majority of the supreme
court, and this immunity amendment was
passed by congress after the decision in the
Counselman case, presumably for the purpose
of meeting the objection urged in that case.
The minority of the court by a dissenting
opinion held the immunity provision not broad
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enough to meet the provisions of the fifth
amendment. The immunity granted by this
act is expressly limited to prosecutions 'under
the laws of the United States' thus withdrawing the protection granted by the fifth amendment as to prosecutions under the state laws
and a·bridging the protection granted by Section 9, Article 1 of the Constitution of Washington, which is not in harmony with the privileges and immunities granted to the citizens
of the several states and inhibitions placed
upon the several states by the Constitution of
the United States."
In the case of In Re Doyle the federal court
held that, under the-privilege against self-incrimination, the witness in a grand jury investigation
could refuse to answer certain questions which
might tend to prove him guilty of splitting fees with
public officials in violation of the criminal laws of
the State of New York.
In the case of In Re Feldstein the witness was
interrogated before the referee in bankruptcy regarding certain checks which had been given by the
bankrupt to the -witness. The object of the examination was to ascertain the consideration for those
checks and to ascertain whether they were given for
gambling debts which the trustee might recover by
action against the witness. The penal code of the

-
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State of New York made gambling a criminal offense. The court held that requiring the witness to
answer the questions might tend to incriminate him
under the laws of the state and therefore that his
privilege applied and he did not have to answer the
questions.
In Morse v. Nussbaum it was held that an officer of a corporation could claim the privilege
.against self-incrimination in an examination under
a New York act suppressing monopolies, though the
act assumed to grant immunity to a witness for all
offenses on account of any transa_ction concerning
vvhich he might testify, since the state act could
grant no immunity to prosecution under federal
laws and since the testimony of the witness would
be likely to subject him to prosecution under existing
federal anti-trust laws.
It is stated by certain text writers that there
is a conflict of authorities on the proposition of )
whether or not the privilege against self-incrimina- ;
tion extends to the possibility of criminal prosecu- t:
tion under the laws of another jurisdiction. See: 58 i
1
Am. J ur., Witnesses, Sec. 51; 82 A.L.R. 1380; and
Vol. VII Wigmore On Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 2258.
The cases cited by appellant above are direct holdings
that the privilege does extend to testimony that would
tend to incriminate under the laws of another jurisdiction. Brown v. Walker (1896) 161 U.S. 591, 40 L.
1
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Ed. 819, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 644, and Hale v. Henkel
(1906) 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. Ed. 652, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep.
370, are the two main cases cited by the text writers
as authority for the contrary view. In both Brown
v. Walker and Hale v. Henkel the court held that the
federal immunity statute involved afforded absolute
immunity from prosecution both under federal and
state law for the offenses to which the questions related and hence the witness was required to answer
because his testimony could not, by reason of the
immunity, incriminate him u11der federal law or
the laws of any other jurisdiction. In Jack v. Kansas
( 1905) 199 U.S. 372, 50 L. Ed. 234, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep.
73, also cited by the text writers as authority for
the contrary view, the court held that the witness in
a state anti-trust proceeding was only required to
answer questions pertaining to intrastate matters,
as to which a state immunity statute granted complete im1nunity fron1 state prosecution, and that the
witness was not required to answer as to interstate
matters and, therefore, he was not compelled to give
evidence that n1ight tend to incriminate him under
federal law. See United States v. Lo1nbardo and In
Doyle, supra p. 15, distingtlishing the above cases
and the other authorities cited by the text writers
on the same g·rotu1ds.
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POINT III
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ASSESSING
ATTORNEYS' FEES AGAINST APPELLANT.

We submit that appellant's refusal to answer
the questions was meritorious and that substantial
justification existed therefor. The court therefore
committed error in assessing attorney's fees against
appellant. See Rule 37 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Respectfully submitted,

McBROOM & HANNI,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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